

Competing for the Platform: How Organized Interests affect Party Positioning in the United States

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Abstract

Recent advances in political party theory suggest policy demanders comprise parties, and the composition of a party coalition varies from election to election. What explains which groups are included in a party coalition in any given cycle? We derive the conditions under which parties articulate an interest group's preferred positions in its quadrennial platform using a game theoretic model, and predict when parties will respond to moderates at the median, or to off-median ideologues, and how these forces compete. We use content analysis on three years of DNC platforms and platform hearing testimony to test three implications of the model: parties include groups that are *loyal* and groups that are *ideologically proximate*, and group loyalty matters less as its *mobilization resources* increase. Theoretical and empirical results show that parties reward loyal groups that are ideologically near the party, but offer no empirical confirmation of a resource effect or interactive effect.

The relationship between political parties and organized interests is complex. Studies have ranged from describing these entities as distinct (Key 1964) or competing (Sabato 1981), to dependent (Dulio and Kolodny 2003) or fully enmeshed (Cohen, *et al.* 2008). We seek to further the understanding of the relationship between groups and parties and to use positive methods to model its strategic nature. We develop a formal model that demonstrates the conditions under which parties respond to groups, and test the implications of the model using data from a reliable instance of direct party-group interaction: the creation of party platforms.

Political parties publicly articulate their ideological positions in quadrennial platforms, and then adopt them in presidential nominating conventions. Organized groups seek to join the party coalition, in part, by having their interests articulated via platform planks. These platforms may be used to appeal to undecided voters (ideological moderates), or to boost enthusiasm (and therefore turnout) from a party’s ideological base. While the Median Voter Theorem tells us parties use platforms only for the prior, the “extended party network” (EPN) theory of parties, and a variety of anecdotes, suggest parties regularly use conventions and platforms for the latter.¹ We contend that platforms can be tools for either, depending on the relative strength of organized groups and of voters not already committed to a candidate or party.

Beginning with the Downsian (1957) theory of voting, we incorporate the logic of the EPN theory of parties, which suggests that parties are made of groups of people with similar interests (Cohen *et al.* 2008; Bawn *et al.* 2012). In so doing, we formally characterize the tension

¹ In 1996, Republican candidate Bob Dole sought to include a moderate plank on abortion in the platform, but was rebuffed by anti-abortion organizations who successfully lobbied for a more conservative statement (Rozell, Wilcox, and Franz 2012, 46-8).

parties face during platform creation, as they consider the interests of both moderate voters positioned at the median and groups of ideologues positioned closer to the extremes. Though not the first to relax the assumptions of median voter theory (Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985; Calvert 1985; Palfrey 1984; Snyder and Ting 2002), we are unique to date in formally merging EPN intuition with median voter principles. Modeling party placement in light of the EPN perspective, we show that a strategic process governs the means by which groups are included in a party coalition. If the EPN view of parties is accurate, then the coalition of groups, or “policy demanders” (Cohen et al. 2008, 15), that make up a party will vary from one election cycle to the next. A critical question implied by this advancement is: in any given election year, under what conditions will a particular group be included in a party coalition? We address this question with a formal model and an empirical test.

Our formal model has two key features that help distinguish parties’ median-converging behavior from their median-diverging behavior, and they are inspired by Hirschman’s (1970) concepts of loyalty and exit. First, we let organized interest groups tempt parties to shift positions by displaying their *loyalty* to the party. Second, we allow voters to *exit* the two-party electoral system, by abstaining from voting or by voting for a third party. The action of loyalty and the threat of exit, combined with the original ideological position of the group, can entice a party to position its platform off the median, closer to a remote ideological position, under specific conditions. The model predicts that a group’s likelihood of having its interests included on a party’s platform in this way increases as its loyalty to the party increases, and as its *ex ante* ideological proximity to the party increases. Notably, groups that can threaten exit from the system will have a higher likelihood of a party including their interests on its platform, even if its loyalty is low, or its ideological proximity is remote.

We then use platform drafting hearing testimony from the Democratic Party, a unique and valuable data source, to quantify group requests and party responses, and test the main implications of our formal model. Content analysis with Wordscores places platform drafting testimony on an ideological spectrum, and allows us to measure where testifying groups advocate for the platform to be. We compare that to where the platform ends up, and find that the Democratic Party is more likely to include testifying groups that are ideologically proximate and loyal to the party, while the threat of exit, measured in terms of the amount of resources a group can mobilize behind its commitments, is not empirically related to platform inclusion.

Our findings provide an important update to the group-party literature by demonstrating that money and resources are less influential in group-party relationships than one might expect. Our empirical inference, though limited to the universe of groups that interact with parties during platform drafting, offers a novel and compelling view of the relationship between groups and parties. Our research design and data source are a creative and appropriate venue from which to test the implications of our model.

This paper offers two main contributions. First, our comprehensive theory predicts when parties will respond to moderates at the median, when they will respond to off-median ideologues, and under what circumstances each force will tip the balance. Scholarship has been unsettled as to whether parties ignore their ideological base during presidential campaigns because it is considered a “sure thing,” and thus appeal to the median and undecided voters (Grossman and Helpman 2001; Paul Frymer 2010), or court the ideological base at the expense of the median voter (see Bawn et al 2012). There is good reason for the indecision – both forces are compelling, and if either group could credibly exit, the threat of losing the election is real. Our work reveals how the decision between the two forces is made, based on precisely the

threats of exit the two groups have with respect to each other. We confirm Frymer's (2010) and Grossman and Helpman's (2001) findings that ideologically remote groups can lose influence, but it is not strictly due to their ideological placement; it is also due to their inability to demonstrate credible alternatives for themselves.

Second, our empirical tests speak to how and why parties offer to articulate group interests nationally, and the specific mix of characteristics and strategies that pull platforms from the median while incorporating groups into the party network as a result of organized action. A striking implication of the formal model is that a unified group can control a party's focus and its platform, if it can both promise loyalty to that party, and threaten the party with exiting the electoral system—regardless of a group's level of resources. This can happen even if the group is ideologically far from the median. Results support several implications of the formal model; ideologues can control the party platform, thus the national policy agenda, not by virtue of their size or ideological position, but by the ability to credibly control the behavior of individuals in a group. We take unique theoretical and empirical steps toward a rigorous quantitative study of the “influence” groups have over platforms.

Party-Group Negotiation during Platform Creation

The extended party network (EPN) perspective argues that groups give rise to parties as they form coalitions in pursuit of their policy goals (Cohen et al. 2008; Bawn et al. 2012). Parties are therefore collections of “policy demanders” who pool resources and support candidates compatible with their collective policy goals. Prior work has already established the overlapping individual memberships of groups and parties as at least intertwined, or at most indistinguishable (Kolodny and Dwyre 1998; Herrnson 2009; Grossman and Dominguez 2009; Koger, Masket,

and Noel 2009; Skinner, Masket and Dulio 2012; Heaney et al. 2012). We know lobbyists have strong partisan affiliations (Victor and Koger 2009), as do 527-classified organizations (Skinner, Masket, and Dulio 2012), and organized interests (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009, 2010).

Organized interests show partisan affiliation with respect to legislative activity (Grossman and Dominguez 2009; Masket 2009) and candidate selection (Cohen et al. 2008; Miller and Schofield 2003). But none of this previous research speaks to the process by which groups organize themselves into party coalitions, or how these coalitions may change from cycle to cycle.

The platform-drafting process is a suitable juncture at which to examine group-party coalition formation, as it is a regular occurrence with a high-stakes outcome. Although the extant literature on the value of party platforms in the United States contradictorily finds platforms to be both vapid (Truman 1962, 282-83), and useful (Pomper and Lederman 1980; Snyder and Ting 2002), the drafting of platforms causes both parties and interest groups to expend vast resources, time, and revenue. Groups see platforms as a tool to voice their interests and broadcast their preferences nationally,² while parties use platforms to bargain with groups for the ultimate electoral prize: votes.

Building on Hirschman (1970; see also Johnson 1990) we argue that groups can threaten to *exit* the two-party system, *voice* opinions in platform-drafting hearings, and express *loyalty* by

² Rozell, Wilcox, and Franz give several examples of groups' pervasive roles in platform drafting (2012, 46-48), arguing groups "assign symbolic importance to the creation of platforms," and "believe that candidates do ultimately heed platforms to some degree" (46). For example, the 2008 Republican platform mentioned McCain's name only once and offered positions more conservative than McCain's on immigration and abortion, due to issue advocates' influence.

committing resources to a party before the election. Platform-drafting becomes a strategic interaction in which groups commit varying levels of support to parties hoping to achieve far-reaching interest articulation, and party leaders decide which groups will be included in their platforms based on how many votes they can credibly deliver. Literature suggests that a group's ability to promise a block of individual votes gives that group bargaining leverage with the party (Harvey 1998; Miller and Schofield 2003; Truman 1962, 300, 304-305). Not only can a group promise to support a party or candidate, they might also help mobilize out-group voters, supplementing the party campaign (Esterling 2007). Such a group might also credibly threaten to *exit* a two-party system, either by not voting, or by voting for a third party. The group's ability to mobilize and control voters, convincing them to vote a particular way, or to exit, provides the group with bargaining leverage over party positioning.

There is debate about whether parties should be more responsive to loyal ideologues, or to more ideologically moderate "flight risks." Grossman and Helpman (2001) use a formal model to show that groups made up of more *strict partisans* are less likely to receive favor from either party, because they are unlikely to change their allegiance. Instead, they find that nonpartisan *moderates* (Dixit and Londregan's (1996) "swing voters"), receive parties' attention because these voters might choose either party. With a similar argument, Paul Frymer makes a convincing case that African Americans have weakened in political power because no one believes they will ever actually abandon their Democratic allegiances, and they therefore have no bargaining leverage (2010).

Although Frymer (2010) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) may have findings that align with intuition regarding the quest for swing votes, they do not explain why certain ideologically remote groups would still be courted during national party conventions or platform-

drafting hearings, and they do not conceive of parties as coalitions of groups *ex ante*. In contrast, Bawn et al. (2012) use historical evidence to argue that organized groups of partisan ideologues get their interests on national campaign agendas by negotiating with candidates. They detail how previously un-noticed policy issues gain national prominence when organized groups offer support to, or threaten to remove support from, those seeking the presidency (580-581).

We contend that moderates and ideologues have options during campaigns and elections beyond being either neglected or taken for granted. Voters can vote individually, group their votes, pledge the loyalty of groups and promise to mobilize other voters with them, or exit the two-party system altogether by refusing to vote, or by voting for a third-party candidate. By giving ideologues options other than voting for the closest party, we relax the forced-voting assumption that disempowers them in most formal voting models. Our model gives partisans the power to become the interests parties cater to when drafting and positioning platforms, contrasting Grossman and Helpman (2001), but also refuses to dismiss the import of individual, non-aligned, or moderate voters in the calculations of party placement, contrasting Bawn et al. (2012). We allow the two forces to compete, thereby finding the conditions under which each force can tip the balance.

The Game

Using the EPN perspective, we view the party platform-drafting process as a negotiation between policy demanders and party leaders. Consider a game among two interest groups and two political parties during platform-drafting. The parties compete for votes, to gain shares of blocks of voters aligned in interest groups, as well as non-aligned voters. The groups compete to have their interests articulated via party platforms. Each group/party has preferences over a set of outcomes, which factor into an ideal point on a one-dimensional ideological spectrum. Each

also has basic beliefs about the relative ideal points of all other groups/parties and the potential vote share of parties. Voters not aligned in groups have single-peaked, symmetrical preferences on the same one-dimensional spectrum.

We assume parties to be unitary actors (consistent with Cox 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1986; Laver and Shepsle 1998). Groups behave similarly to a candidate competition model, in that group leaders make decisions for the groups, so the group leadership represents a unitary actor. Group members may behave differently from group leaders; members act based on the actions of the parties and the actions of the groups. When a group's leadership aligns with a party, the value the party gives that alignment depends on its perception of the group's ability to mobilize out-group voters, and deliver in-group voters according to leaders' commitments.

The game of complete and perfect information consists of four players: Group F, Group G, Party A, Party B: $N = [F, G, A, B]$. Non-aligned voters make no strategic decisions, but they can affect payoffs; in payoff calculations they are represented by $[M]$. Groups and parties play a two-stage sequential game with simultaneous moves. In Stage 1, groups align with parties. In Stage 2, parties include groups (see Online Appendix and Figure A.1)

During Stage 1, each group simultaneously has three options: $Q_{f,g} = [A, B, S]$ where A (or B) indicates giving full loyalty to Party A (or B), and S indicates splitting loyalty between Parties A and B. If giving loyalty to Party p only, Group i devotes all its resources to that party, expressing the intention to vote and mobilize completely for Party p . If splitting loyalty, Group i divides resources between the parties, indicating the potential of some of its members to vote for the opposition party.

In Stage 2 the two parties play, both having seen Stage 1. The parties simultaneously have the options of Including Group G (G), Including Group F (F), or Not including (N) the

interests of either Group in its platform: $R_{a,b} = [F, G, N]$. If Party p includes only one group in its platform, it moves its platform toward that group's ideal point. If Party p includes neither group, it places its platform at the median.³ After platforms are placed, actions dictate payoffs under the rules given in Table 1.

[Table 1 Goes Here]

Each stage is a 3x3 simultaneous game, creating 81 strategy outcomes (see Figure 1). Note the Roman numeral over each sub-matrix in Figure 1—each represents the sub-game played by the two parties in Stage 2, after the two groups have played. Say Group F pledges all loyalty to Party A, and Group G pledges all loyalty to Party A; the parties will find themselves playing Sub-matrix I. Since the parties each face 3 options simultaneously, there are 9 possible outcomes within Sub-matrix I. If both parties give concessions to Group F (depicted as “Party A → F” and “Party B → F”), players end up in the top left cell of the sub-matrix, outcome: AAFF. This reflects the outcome, “Group F pledges all loyalty to Party A, Group G pledges all loyalty to Party A, Party A gives concessions to Group F, Party B gives concessions to Group F.” The same logic applies to the remaining sub-matrices.

[Figure 1 Goes Here]

³ Including both groups, though possible, leads to uninteresting predictions because it is tantamount to including one group (if both groups are on the same side of the median), or including neither group (if the groups are on opposite sides of the median). This move was therefore considered and dismissed, for parsimony and clarity. Please consult authors for details.

Terms are defined according to Table 2. Note that, as voters can exit and enter the two-party system, the total number of voters and vote-getters can always change. Thus parties do not compete for jointly-exhaustive vote shares.

[Table 2 Goes Here]

Groups derive more utility the closer platforms are to their ideal points, and they are better off if more votes go to closer platforms (Equations (1) and (2)). The distance between a group's ideal and a party's platform factors negatively into the group's utility, and is weighted by the number of votes that party receives in the election:⁴

$$P_F(s_F) = -\alpha|X_A - X_F| - \beta|X_B - X_F| \quad (1)$$

$$P_G(s_G) = -\alpha|X_A - X_G| - \beta|X_B - X_G| \quad (2)$$

Parties are vote-maximizers, and position themselves to get the most votes, including from voters aligned with each group, those aligned with neither group (“non-aligned moderates”), and those considering staying out of the electorate altogether. Payoffs for parties are the net acquisition of votes, based on platform placement and group alliances (Equations (3) and (4)). This is determined by the out-group and in-group mobilization potential of any and all loyal groups, plus votes received from voters who are not a member of either group, minus any group votes it loses to the opposing party, or any voters that exit the two-party system, as a result of its platform placement. At each terminal node the payoff can appear quite complicated.

⁴ We acknowledge that this utility function does not explicitly model all dimensions of group utility. We did model and solve the game with a more complex group utility function, but found that the solution depended exclusively on platform positioning vis-à-vis ideal points. We therefore present the most parsimonious utility function here.

Suppose both parties stay at the median despite receiving split loyalty from both groups. The payoff to Party A is: the number of out-group voters Group G is able and willing to mobilize m_G , plus the number of Group G's members who vote behind its leaders' commitments l_G , minus any exiters/defectors from Group G who do not vote for Party A because it did not move toward the group ($-e_{GAM}-d_{GAM}$), plus any defectors from Group G who would have voted for Party B but do not because it did not move toward them (d_{GBM}), plus all the same voters corresponding to Group F, plus the non-aligned voters the party can capture, V . This is expressed as:

$$P_A(r_A) = \alpha = m_G + l_G - e_{GAM} - d_{GAM} + d_{GBM} + m_f + l_f - e_{FAM} - d_{FAM} + d_{FBM} + V \quad (3)$$

$$P_B(r_B) = \beta = m_G + l_G - e_{GBM} - d_{GBM} + d_{GAM} + m_f + l_f - e_{FBM} - d_{FBM} + d_{FAM} + V \quad (4)$$

Notice that although group ideological placement (with respect to the original median) can vary, the group cannot strategically manipulate its ideology. A group's ideological placement factors into payoffs and outcomes via its ability to defect to the other party. A group close to the median that splits loyalty will have a credible threat of defecting to the other party. Groups that are ideologically far from the median, or that pledge full loyalty to one group, have no credible threat of defection. Group *loyalty* is the attribute the group can willfully change. The party's response to that decision, by placing its platform in a particular location, can capitalize on the group's mobilization efforts. Although the party's estimate of group mobilization potential factors into its platform placement decision, those mobilization efforts are not a strategy employed by the group itself.

We solve for Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using backward induction, first finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the subgame at each terminal node in Stage 2, when only parties play. We then insert the equilibrium solution set of each terminal node into the proper sub-matrix of

Stage 1, and solve Stage 1 using the payoffs from Stage 2's outcomes.⁵ We find that parties do cluster around the median under certain conditions. Assume the two groups have exit threats equal to each other and equal to the exit threat of non-aligned voters. Assume, also, that both groups are ideologically near the median, credibly threatening defection. In this scenario, both groups split loyalty, both parties include neither group, and both parties set their platforms on the ideological median, giving the outcome (SSNN), in what we call the *Baseline Solution*.

Within the Baseline Solution lies the first key to pulling parties away from the median. For one group to be powerful enough to compel the parties to move toward including it in this baseline situation, that group's combined exit and defection threats must outweigh the other group's exit and defection, plus the non-aligned moderates' exit threat, plus any boost of non-aligned moderates a party would get if it stayed at the median when the opposing party

⁵ As this is an extensive game with perfect information and simultaneous moves, Osborne tells us the appropriate solution concept is backward induction by solving for the NE of each stage (2004, Chapter 7). Because each terminal node involves a decision of two actors simultaneously, we cannot simply find an optimal action for one player at each terminal node, then reason backwards. Instead, we will find a *list* of actions for the players who move at the beginning of Stage 2, understanding that each party's action at that point is optimal given the other party's simultaneous action. The appropriate solution concept for each stage is thus that of a standard strategic game, which is either: showing that an action profile is an equilibrium by checking each action profile in turn; or constructing and studying the players' best response functions (ibid., p. 209-210). As these players' preferences are given in a one-dimensional space, we opt for the former solution. See Supplementary Materials in Online Appendix for full proof.

abandoned it to move toward the group. Even under these most basic circumstances, we see movement from the median toward a group, but only if that group can promise a strong and *combined* threat of exit and defection. And since the threat of defection only exists when loyalty is split, this condition is only met when the group splits loyalty.

Within this condition lies a subtle, yet powerful and robust, conclusion of the model. Under no circumstance does a group receive platform concessions from a party for which it does not show some degree of loyalty. Said differently, a party never includes a group that expresses full loyalty to the opposing party. This is because the party receives no voters from the group that gave it no loyalty, and will lose non-aligned voters (and possibly voters from the other group), if it moves toward a non-loyal group. We thus derive:

Proposition I: If a group shows no loyalty to a party, it should expect no inclusion in that party's platform.

Although this finding might seem intuitive, it contradicts the idea that full loyalty to a party is wasted. While the ability to split loyalty might give them a greater chance of inclusion, a lack of loyalty gives them no chance whatsoever. We now focus on the variations of exit and loyalty that tell us what else a group might capitalize on in order to have its interests articulated at the national party platform level.

Vary Exit

A group that unifies and *exits* the entire two-party system can damage a party's electoral chances, even if that group would never defect to the opposition party. We find that a group's threat of exit is most powerful when it outweighs both the threat of exit of non-aligned voters

and the exit threat of the other group⁶ (recall: both groups remain close to the median). The group with the larger threat of exit is included in the platform of one party if its exit threat outweighs the other group's exit and defection threats combined. This dominant group gives full loyalty to the party of its choice. If the opposing group is far from the median, it splits loyalty to receive its optimal outcome, and the remaining party stays at the median.⁷ If the opposing group is close to the median and can threaten defection, it splits loyalty and pulls one party in its direction with its defection threat.⁸

These results have important implications for platforms and elections. If the dominant group with the higher threat of exit can credibly threaten defection to the other party due to its ideological proximity to the median, it *still* gives full loyalty to one party. If this group cannot credibly threaten defection due to its ideological remoteness, it does not need defection (splitting loyalty) as a tool to lure a platform in its direction.⁹ In either case, the strength of its exit threat means that one platform will always include this group. Thus:

⁶ When: $\text{Exit}_G > \text{Exit}_F > \text{Exit}_{\text{Moderates}}$; $\text{Exit}_G > \text{Exit}_{\text{Moderates}} > \text{Exit}_F$; $\text{Exit}_G > \text{Exit}_{\text{Moderates}} = \text{Exit}_F$

⁷ This occurs in outcomes: {(SAGN), (SBNG), (ASFN), (BSNF)}.

⁸ This occurs in outcomes: {(SAGF), (ASFG), (SBFG), (BSGF)}.

⁹ But see Frymer (2010) who argues that African Americans were essentially “captured” by the Democratic Party—Blacks were ideologically proximate and loyal, yet received little in terms of party “rewards” (*e.g.*, platform planks or policy positions) until the late 20th century. Consistent with Frymer's argument, this is likely due to racism, which is not represented in our formal model.

Proposition II.A: As a group's threat of exit increases, its loyalty becomes less important as a factor in determining platform inclusion.

Yet the other group is not always at a complete loss. When this group with a lower exit threat is close to the median and can threaten defection, it can pull the party platforms toward itself if it has enough combined exit and defection threat. Since defection is only a threat when loyalty is split, the converse of Proposition II.A must also be true:

Proposition II.B: As a group's threat of exit decreases, its loyalty becomes more important as a factor in determining platform inclusion.

In this way an ideologically remote group can influence the content of the party platform due to a party's fear of it exiting the two-party system. This means a group of known partisans can help form the national policy debate simply due to strong group cohesion and the party's belief that it will essentially "walk-out" of the two-party electoral process. Recent US presidential elections reflect the effects this sort of exit can have. Had all Perot voters voted for George H. W. Bush in 1992, only 4 states (AS, DC, MD, NY) would have gone to Clinton, leaving Bush with a 486-52 electoral win. Had all Nader supporters voted for Gore in 2000, Gore would have won a decisive 298-237 over George W. Bush.¹⁰

Vary Loyalty

A group must be ideologically close to the median to possess a credible defection threat. But the threat remains latent if the group gives full loyalty to one party. To implement the threat,

¹⁰ Results tabulated by the authors from data of the American Presidency Project, University of California Santa Barbara.

the group must both be near the median *and* split loyalty. Varying loyalty thus requires varying both a group's ideological proximity and its action.

Holding exit threats to their baseline (equal across groups and non-aligned voters), suppose one group is ideologically close to the median and splits loyalty, while the other group is ideologically remote. The ideologically proximate group can pull both platforms in its direction if its defection threat outweighs the exit threat and potential boost of non-aligned voters.¹¹ In this way, closer proximity to the parties' position is more likely to yield inclusion.¹²

Proposition III: As a group's ex ante ideological proximity to the parties increases, it is more likely to be included in the platform, all other things being equal.

Discussion

The model predicts that groups that are ideologically proximate to parties, that express higher levels of loyalty to parties, and that pose high threats of exiting the two-party system are more likely to be included in a party platform. We should expect interest groups to be included in platforms based on the number of voters they can credibly promise to control (by inciting them to vote, convincing them to exit, telling them to defect). We should expect groups that put all their support behind one party to be distinguished from groups that do not. The more disparate is the ideological congruence between each group and a particular party, the more likely we are to see distinctions among the levels of interest articulation of different groups of policy demanders in that party's platform.

¹¹ This occurs in outcomes: {(SSGG), (SSFF)}.

¹² Brunell (2005) argues that interest groups are likely to favor one party or the other, even though they may, on paper, support both.

Note Proposition II, illuminating the conditionality of loyalty and exit. Members of ideologically remote groups that cannot use splitting to credibly threaten defection have *exit* as a viable option to voting for their nearest party. If their exit threat is high enough, an ideologically remote group can still be included in the platform, pulling one platform toward itself and away from a moderate group. We should therefore expect to see an empirical difference among groups of policy demanders based on the interaction of exit and loyalty; as groups grow in their threat of exit, loyalty will become less important as a determinant of inclusion.

Our model offers resolution to a few debates in the literature. First, in the debate over whether partisan groups can have influence over party placement, the answer is *yes*, under certain conditions. We show that Frymer (2010) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) are correct in suggesting that ideologically remote groups can lose influence, but it is not strictly due to their remoteness, it is also due to their inability to show credible alternatives for themselves. If an ideologically remote group credibly threatens to exit the two-party system, a party will respond to it, and that group will have its interests articulated on the campaign platform.

Second, in the discussion of whether groups stand apart from parties or groups compose parties, our model shows that parties respond to groups and attempt to incorporate their interests when it serves the parties' interests. . The groups' interests that compose a platform depend on groups' characteristics during a particular cycle. As those characteristics change, so does the platform, and so may the party itself.

With our model, we not only accommodate the constant tug between the forces of moderate and extreme policy demanders, we also find the conditions under which each force will prevail over platform formation. Although our findings have implications for platform placement vis-à-vis the median voter, we choose not to empirically test platform placement on a

spatial spectrum in this paper. We instead address the model's implications regarding interest group inclusion in the platform itself. We thus turn to our empirical investigation to investigate how Democratic Party platforms have developed in three recent presidential campaign cycles.

Data and Methods

Our theoretical model dictates that in order to empirically test the conditions under which group interests are articulated in party platforms, we must operationalize a group's potential to mobilize voters in terms of its loyalty to, and ideological distance from, a party. Our empirical approach is necessarily limited, in that we are only able to measure the organized groups of policy demanders who attempt to become part of the party coalition through this mechanism, and we cannot observe groups not (yet) attempting to join a party, nor individual voters not aligned with groups or parties. However, our approach allows us to measure the characteristics of groups that seek to become part of a party coalition in a given election cycle. We expect loyal groups, ideologically close to the status quo position of the party, with the resources to mobilize voters, to be included in the platform. We also expect loyalty to be a more important factor in determining inclusion for low-resource groups than for high-resource groups. We test the latter claim using an interaction term.

Platform hearings provide a venue for groups to offer testimony, evidence, or written comments on their views of the party platform and provide an excellent source of data from which to estimate the spatial positions of groups trying to influence platform creation. Our unit of analysis is a group-year, accounting for each group that testified at a DNC platform hearing in

1996, 2000, or 2004 (N=80).¹³ Our dependent variable, as guided by the model, is the difference between the group's testimony and the DNC platform in a given year. We derive this by analyzing the content of the testimonies and platform using *Wordscores* (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003; Benoit 2009). We note that our empirical approach has a selection bias. Our data includes the complete population of groups that jockeyed for platform position during these three election cycles; however, groups that do not participate in platform hearings are unobserved. We therefore do not draw inference on the population of *all* groups who might hope to have their interests included by the party in a given year, but only those who were in a position to be included by parties in the first place. While this limits our inference, our approach increases our understanding of the competition for party attention among this class of groups, which has not been previously understood.

Using Text as Data

Using the Wordscores Stata software code developed by Laver, Benoit, and Garry (2003), we analyze party platforms and hearing transcripts. We produce spatial estimates of policy positions based on word frequencies, including standard errors and confidence intervals. The output allows us to assess whether the differences between the platforms and the hearing transcripts are due to substantive differences.¹⁴

¹³ Data for 2008 were not available. Also, the Democratic Party significantly altered its platform drafting process in 2008 and chose to conduct public platform-drafting meetings in all 50 states. Collecting testimony from 2008 is therefore significantly more costly than for 1996- 2004.

¹⁴ We assume groups reveal sincere preferences in their hearing testimony.

The Wordscores technology utilizes two types of texts: “virgin texts,” have unknown ideological scores; “reference texts,” have known ideological scores. The user assigns a known policy dimension and value to the reference texts. The software infers positions (*e.g.*, ideology scores) of the virgin texts by comparing their word frequencies to the frequencies in the reference texts.

Wordscores produces a “transformed Wordscore” for each virgin text, which provides a relative ideological value compared to the reference texts. This method strips words of their “substantive” meaning and assigns policy scores by “treating words purely as data ... whose policy positions can be confidently estimated or assumed” (Laver, Benoit, and Garry 2003, 313). The Wordscores technique works well for our purposes because it allows direct comparison of the testimony to the platform, using the same scale and reference points. While we may not be able to prove that a group *caused* a platform shift, inasmuch as testimony is temporally prior to platform adoption and we can measure the language content of each using an objective and consistent measure, the greater the congruence between a group’s testimony and the party platform, the more its interests are articulated.¹⁵

We obtained the full (hardcopy) texts of the Democratic Party platform hearings from 1996, 2000, and 2004.¹⁶ We digitized the necessary information into plain text, extracting

¹⁵ While there is no way to verify that parties directly adopt groups’ demands, a direct link between group requests and party drafting is not necessary for our purpose. If the final platform draft more closely mirrors the requests of Group X over Group Y, the party is more inclusive of Group X than Group Y.

¹⁶ The Republican National Committee denied us access to their hearing testimony.

testimony and question responses for each participating interest group. Party websites supplied the full text of each party's platform. Group websites supplied mission statements for each interest group, which we used to estimate group ideal positions.

We use the party platforms of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC) as reference texts. We obtained independent scores for these reference texts from the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens 2009).¹⁷ Table 3 presents the ideological scores and word counts for all reference texts.¹⁸

[Table 3 Goes Here]

We can summarize the Wordscores procedure as follows. First, we use the Republican and Democratic platforms from 1996, 2000, and 2004 as reference texts with known ideological scores. These provide the *a priori* anchors of the policy space in which we seek to place interest groups. We count the word stems in these reference texts. Second, we count the word stems in the group testimony, or “virgin texts.” Third, the Wordscores add-in for Stata calculates the relative frequencies of each word stem in the platforms, compared to those in the testimonies. Based on these frequencies Wordscores calculates a “score” for each word that describes the

¹⁷ The Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) provides quantitative content analysis for party manifestoes from over 50 countries spanning more than 50 years. Although much CMP data is publically available (Budge 2001; Budge et al. 2001), the data we needed was not. [Source removed to preserve anonymity.]

¹⁸ A superior research design would measure *change* in the platform itself from initial drafting to final adoption, with group input occurring between these events. We have been unable to obtain “rough drafts” of platforms; therefore, such a design is currently not plausible.

expected ideological position of the word in the policy space that has been previously defined by the platforms. The more data (*e.g.*, words) that are in the function, the finer the estimates become.

It is worth noting that an artifact of this procedure is that the Democratic and Republican platforms provide the polar extremes of the policy space, suggesting that all interest groups are ideologically between the parties. While this is not a realistic assumption to make in terms of the ideological positions of groups relative to both parties in the true latent space, we are only concerned with the absolute *distance* between individual groups and the Democratic platform. We therefore use the spatial positioning technique made possible by Wordscores because it allows us to measure the individual distance between groups and the Democratic platforms of 1996, 2000, and 2004; however, we do not mean to suggest that the procedure reveals the “true” latent ideological space in which these groups and parties exist.

Dependent Variable

In Figure 2 (parts A, B, and C) we display transformed Wordscores results for each of the three platforms, and the group testifiers. The graphs provide a general sense of the data distribution, the groups involved, and which groups tend to be closer to the platform. Each graph includes the transformed Wordscores values for the DNC and RNC platforms (appearing at the extremes), depicting the reference texts used to calculate the transformed Wordscores values for the groups. To calculate the extent to which an interest group is included in the platform, we compute the absolute value of the difference between the interest groups’ testimony Wordscore and the platform Wordscore for that year. For the statistical model we multiply that distance by negative one (-1) so larger values represent greater congruity between groups and the party’s final position. We note that the party platforms provide (arbitrary) upper and lower bounds on

this analysis, as all group testimony scores lie between the platforms. As noted above, this is an artifact of Wordscores algorithm, but we argue that this does not affect our substantive analysis because we are only interested in the congruence between testimony and platforms.¹⁹ These values do not have a particular substantive or intuitive interpretation; only the relative differences are of interest. We therefore interpret our findings with predicted probabilities of the dependent variable.

[Figure 2 goes here.]

Independent Variables

Interest group *ideology* is operationalized using content analysis.²⁰ We use groups' mission statements to measure their ideological position because it provides an indication of a group's general priorities that is distinct from the specific "asks" the group takes to the party. We are interested in groups' ideological positions relative to the party's status quo position at the time the group testified. The best estimate of the party's ideological position *prior* to adopting the new platform is the position of the previous platform. We use the CMP estimate of the DNC and RNC party platforms in the election year preceding the group's testimony as reference texts in the Wordscores analysis (*e.g.*, the ideological position relative to the party for a group that testified in 1996 is estimated using the DNC 1992 platform CMP score).²¹ We then calculate the

¹⁹ We could have avoided this feature by excluding the RNC platforms; however, the Wordscores algorithm is more accurate when more known reference texts are included.

²⁰ Supplementary Materials contain variable sources and summary statistics.

²¹ The RNC platform is included for reference. It increases the accuracy of the Wordscores output.

ideology variable as the absolute value of the difference between groups' Wordscores value on mission statements and the prior year party platform, multiplied by negative one (-1) so larger values indicate greater congruity between parties and groups.

Rather than attempt to measure *exit*, admittedly complicated to operationalize, we instead strive to capture a group's resources to mobilize voters. Though not a precise indicator of the number of voters that will follow leaders' commitments, it should roughly indicate how many out-group voters can be motivated to enter the system, and how many in-group voters can be motivated to vote for a party or exit the system, as a result of group effort. We create a standardized index for each group based on two characteristics known to affect their ability to mobilize voters (Kollman 1998): number of members and reported budget. Each measure is standardized among groups, summed, and standardized again.

Loyalty is the action taken by the groups in the formal model. We measure this as the percentage of campaign contributions made by each group's Political Action Committee, or by individual employees of the group, to the Democratic Party during the two-year campaign cycle of the testimony. We weight the percentage by the total amount of money the group gave to Democratic candidates.²² Most of the testifying groups give heavily to Democrats. Twenty-four have no PAC and no employee contributions tracked by the Federal Elections Commission. There is a question of endogeneity with respect to using campaign contributions as a signal of loyalty—do groups give to candidates they assume will support their policies, or do elected

²² If a group testified in 2000, *loyalty* measures the weighted percentage of PAC and individual employee contributions given to the Democratic Party in 1999-2000. About 50% of groups do not have a PAC; eighteen of these gave individual employee contributions.

representatives support the policies of donors? Evidence largely suggests that campaign contributions are made to candidates who share the donor's ideology or policy preferences (see Warwo 2001). We therefore submit that PAC and individual contributions from groups are a reasonable way to measure a group's dedication to one party or the other.

Expectations

Proposition IIa predicts that higher threats of exit are more likely to yield platform inclusion, and that the higher the exit threat, the less important loyalty will be. We therefore expect the effect of group resources on platform inclusion to be conditional on a group's level of loyalty. We employ an interaction of *resources* and *loyalty* to capture this effect.

The coefficient on *resources X loyalty* tells whether loyalty matters for differing levels of resources, in terms of the platform inclusion a group receives. Proposition IIb indicates that among groups with low resources (threats of exit), more loyal groups will be more included than less loyal groups. As resources increase, we expect the effect of loyalty on inclusion to decrease.

Due to the interaction, the coefficient on *resources* gives the change in platform inclusion as resources increase for groups that have average loyalty.²³ Proposition I says we expect groups with *no* loyalty to be given excluded from the platform, regardless of resources. We will use expected values to evaluate this expectation, as the coefficient itself does not allow us to evaluate our expectation. The coefficient on *loyalty* gives the change in platform inclusion as loyalty increases and resources are zero (average). We expect this relationship to be positive.

Consistent with Proposition III, we expect that groups with *closer ideological positions* to the

²³ Recall that loyalty and resources are standardized.

party before platform drafting will be more included in the final platform, and expect to observe this with a positive and significant coefficient on the ideology variable.

Results and Analysis

We estimate a linear regression model with an interaction term, using bootstrapped standard errors because our Wordscores estimates factor into the creation of two variables. We also cluster the error term on groups, as several groups are represented multiple times in this short cross-sectional time series. Because we have an unbalanced panel crossing three time periods, and the number of cross-sectional units exceeds the number of periods ($N=80$,²⁴ $T=3$), our data do not fit the $T>N$ restriction desired for standard cross-sectional time series analysis (e.g., Beck and Katz 1995, 644). We therefore insert timewise fixed effects for each platform year, excluding 1996, the reference year (appropriate for short panels, see Arellano 2003; Wooldridge 2003). The statistical model is (estimates reported in Table 4):²⁵

$$\text{Platform Inclusion}_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Ideological Congruence}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Loyalty}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Resources}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Loyalty} * \text{Resources}_{it} + \beta_5 D_{it_1} + \beta_6 D_{it_2} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

[Table 4 Goes Here]

Proposition III posits that groups ideologically closer to the status quo position of the party would be more likely to be included in the platform. The positive and significant

²⁴ Due to missingness in the covariates, $n<80$; we employ casewise deletion rather than imputation.

²⁵ We estimated specifications with robust standard errors and random effects, which yielded results not appreciably different from those presented here. We report the model that includes the parameters and non-parametric bootstrap that best captures the assumed distribution of the data.

coefficient on *Ideological Congruence* shows that this is indeed the case. We remind the reader that this measure captures the congruence between a group's mission statement and the platform of the *prior* election cycle—reducing the likelihood that the variable is simply capturing pre-existing congruence between the group and party. Although we expect a group's mission statement to overlap ideologically with its testimony, the two are not the same document, and they reflect different ambitions of the group. The mission statement is a superior representation of the aggregate ideological leanings of the interest group. By comparing a group's mission statement to the ideological position of the party's prior platform we capture the relative difference between the general position of the group and the status quo point of the party. When this distance is narrow, group preferences about immediate and salient policy issues are more likely to be found in a party's platform.

Consistent with Propositions I and IIa-b, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient on loyalty. Parties have an incentive to reward loyal organizations to entice them to vote and to work for the party (discouraging exit, inciting in-group voting, and encouraging out-group mobilization). Our findings show that groups with an average level of resources are increasingly included in the platform as their loyalty increases.²⁶ However, a complete evaluation of Propositions I and IIa-b requires generating expected values because the variable is standardized and included in an interaction term.

Our coefficient on *resources* indicates that mobilization potential does not have an effect on group inclusion when loyalty is zero (average). While consistent with Proposition I, it is not

²⁶ Recall that the measures for loyalty and resources are standardized.

confirmatory because of the standardized variable and interaction term. Below we discuss more details on the relationship between resources and inclusion.

Discussion

Our statistical model confirms Proposition III, and shows tacit support for Propositions I and IIa-b. Substantive interpretation should focus on the relative differences between groups and proper interpretation of the interaction effect. Figure 3 shows the predicted expected values²⁷ of platform inclusion across groups with high and low mobilization potential, for those with maximum and minimum party loyalty. The y-axis is the predicted expected value of platform inclusion, where larger values (that is, closer to zero) indicate greater inclusion, or greater group-party congruity.²⁸ Groups with low mobilization potential (no resources) are included more when also displaying maximum loyalty (shown on the left side of the Figure). Groups with low mobilization potential displaying minimum loyalty are included less than groups showing more loyalty, but the effect is not statistically significant, shown by the overlapping 95% confidence interval bars ($Z = 1.07, p > 0.283$).

[Figure 3 Goes Here]

Groups with high mobilization potential (on the right side of the Figure) that demonstrate maximum loyalty are also included in the party coalition more than groups with high mobilization potential showing minimum loyalty, but the difference is also not statistically significant ($Z = 0.32, p > 0.746$). Proposition II predicts that the effect of loyalty on inclusion

²⁷ We generated predicted probabilities using the Clarify software developed for Stata (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001).

²⁸ The range of the dependent variable is -120.1 to -24.9.

diminishes as the threat of exit (level of resources) increases, but we do not find statistical support for this expectation.

Overall, our empirical results cast a shadow on the role of group resources in influencing party platforms. However, we do not interpret these findings to suggest generally that group resources do not influence party behavior because our inference is limited in two important ways. First, our study includes a small number of groups at only three time points (because these are the specialized data that were available). Second, our sample of groups only includes those who testified before the platform drafting committee, and it is possible that well-funded groups influenced the process but did not participate at the hearings. Since we cannot exclude such possibilities the inference we draw from our findings are dampened. Nonetheless, our results show that from our sample of nontrivial data, group resources do not predict inclusion in a platform, with or without conditions of loyalty.

Moreover, our data prevent us from making a strong test of Propositions I and II for two reasons. First, we were not able to obtain hearing data from the Republican Party, so our ability to test the inference of groups choosing between parties is highly limited. Second, as noted previously our data contain a selection bias because we only observe the behavior of groups *that the party invited to provide testimony*. It is likely that the Democratic Party would seek input from their most loyal activists, and if so, our loyalty measure is biased due to the sample on which we make observations. These are limitations of the research design, however, not of the formal or empirical models. In this manuscript, we have opted to trade-off a superior data sample, for one that includes novel and superior measures of group-party interactions and distances but cannot provide a conclusive test of Propositions I and II. In our view, the

opportunity to use group testimony to parties is one worth pursuing though it may offer shortcomings with respect to the sample.

The empirical results suggest a strategic group-party interaction resulting in a negotiated platform, which represents the aggregation of group policy interests that make up the party preferences in a given election cycle. By analyzing the population of testifying groups, and identifying the characteristics of those with successfully articulated interests, we provide a creative and conservative test of how groups achieve interest articulation in party platforms. Testifying groups that demonstrate higher degrees of party loyalty through campaign contributions, and those with ideological preferences closer to the party, are more likely to see their interests articulated in the platform. We do not find evidence that parties respond differentially to testifying groups with large and small mobilization potential, whether conditional on loyalty or not. We expect many readers will find the null finding on resources to be counter-intuitive.

Conclusions

We contribute to extended party network theory by offering evidence that parties represent extended coalitions of organized interests and these interests jockey with one another to build a party coalition during each election cycle. We argue that we can observe the make-up of the final coalition of “policy demanders” by analyzing the content of party platforms. In our efforts, we draw on literature positing that special interests can draw parties from the median of the electorate, and build a formal model of two interest groups and two political parties to determine the conditions under which parties will yield position (via the platform) to groups of voters. Importantly, we acknowledge that voters may choose to exit the two-party electoral system, by abstaining from voting or by voting for a third party. We identify the potential for

groups to mobilize voters and their demonstrated loyalty to the party as determinant characteristics that describe how parties will respond to their requests for policy positions. The formal model produces three testable implications: (1) parties reward loyal interest groups with platform inclusion, (2) the relationship between loyalty and platform inclusion is conditional on a group's credible ability to mobilize members/voters, and (3) parties are more likely to reward groups ideologically closer to the existing party coalition.

We use unique data to test these implications. Acquiring the transcripts of three cycles of testimony provided to the DNC's platform writing committee, we use testimony text to determine how much congruence there is between what groups requested and what they got (on the final platform). We use word frequencies and Wordscores technology to produce reasonable estimates of overlap between groups and parties. Our empirical findings support the theoretical model and show direct support for Proposition III — groups ideologically closer to the party are more likely to be included in the platform. We find some support for Proposition I--that groups showing no loyalty will receive no platform concessions; rather our findings support the notion groups that show more loyalty are given greater presence in the platform. We find no support for Propositions IIa and b that state that the effect of loyalty on party inclusion is conditional on group resources; moreover, we find no evidence that group resources (threat of exit) affects the likelihood that a group will receive platform concessions at all.

We therefore have an incongruity between the implications provided by the formal model and the inferences drawn from the empirical model; the former suggests that a group that controls a great number of voters can influence the party, regardless of its level of loyalty, while the latter shows that group resources have no effect on a group's ability to retain platform concessions. Our research cannot reconcile this difference with the current data and we urge

scholars to continue to study this dynamic. Given that the inferences we can draw from the empirical model are limited due to our sample and the difficulty in measuring group resources (as a means of mobilizing voters), we suspect that future research will side with the theoretical expectation that group resources have a conditional effect on party inclusion. This contradiction provides a ripe area for future research.

Substantively, our paper offers first steps toward a greater understanding of party platforms, often thought to be useless, and neglected in the greater academic agenda. If parties use platforms to mobilize voters vis-à-vis interest groups, the study of those platforms and the groups participating in their construction has implications for the analysis of networks and party-building (see Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009). For example, can weakly-connected groups use platform drafting hearings to gain better network positions? Do the relative connections between groups and parties predict meaningful behavior from parties (*e.g.*, which candidates to nominate) and groups (*e.g.*, which candidates to support with direct financial contribution or non-coordinated spending)? Platform drafting politics can provide insight into broader cleavages within a party that may reveal new insights about party positions, candidate strategies, and policy goals. Further work should explore these networks empirically by expanding the coverage of platform hearings to earlier and later dates, should the data become available.

Theoretically, our work represents one of the first attempts to formally model some of the primary implications of the EPN perspective, and to test them empirically. We do not view parties and platforms as being positioned either at the median *or* toward the poles; rather, our model accounts for both median forces *and* polar forces, acknowledging that parties and their platforms are tugged in both directions by the groups of policy demanders who seek to form a party coalition in a given cycle. With this allowance we are able to specify the conditions under

which median forces will prevail over polar forces, and vice versa. Theoretically and empirically, it appears that groups at the median, previously assumed better off than ideologically remote groups unable to credibly threaten defection to the opposition, are actually in a power struggle with these remote groups that can both promise full loyalty and threaten exit.

Our theoretical findings offer normative implications for group strategy, come platform writing season. Groups with few resources can compensate for their disadvantage by demonstrating strict loyalty to one party, all else being equal. Groups with greater mobilization potential (or more resources) will be more successful if they can use their resources to credibly threaten to exit the two-party system. And if groups seek rents (*e.g.*, platform planks) from parties, they can expect to be more satisfied with the final platform if they are already seen as ideologically proximate to the party.

Notwithstanding differences in our theoretical and empirical models regarding group resources, there are two consistent findings that the sum of our research makes clear: political parties are responsive to organized interests that are ideologically similar to the status quo party, and to those who have demonstrated loyalty to the party. Moreover, the composition of parties changes across time in systematic ways. We look to future scholarship to improve our ability to measure group actions, incentives, and resources with respect to parties.

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Table 1 Rules Relating Actions to Payoffs

| Actor | Action and Consequence for Payoff |
|----------------------|--|
| If a Group... | <p>...pledges full loyalty to one party:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The other party receives none of that group’s mobilization or loyalty votes. - The party receiving full loyalty receives that group’s mobilization and loyalty votes, minus: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any members that <i>exit</i> the two-party system because a party fails to move toward it. <p>...splits loyalty between the two parties, each party receives a portion of that group’s mobilization and loyalty votes, minus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Any members of that group that <i>exit</i> the two-party system because a party fails to move toward it. - Any members of that group that <i>defect</i> to vote for the opposing party if the opposing party ends up closer to that group at the end of the game. <p>Caveat: Defection is only possible for groups ideologically close to the median. Ideologically remote groups can split loyalty, but the action does not carry with it the possibility of defection.</p> |
| If a Party... | <p>...moves from the median toward one group and away from the other, it may lose:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - non-aligned moderate votes from the median - votes from the other group if that group pledged the party loyalty and members choose to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>exit</i> the two-party system - <i>defect</i> to vote for the opposition <p>...moves farther away from a group’s ideal:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - more members of that group are likely to <i>exit</i> or <i>defect</i> |

Table 2 Definition of Terms

| | |
|---|--|
| $P_p(q_{i_1}, q_{i_2}, r_{p_1}, r_{p_2})$ | payoff to Party p given the outcome reached when Group i_1 plays q_{i_1} and Group i_2 plays q_{i_2} in Stage 1, and Party p_1 plays r_{p_1} and Party p_2 plays r_{p_2} in Stage 2. |
| $P_i(q_{i_1}, q_{i_2}, r_{p_1}, r_{p_2})$ | payoff to Group i given the outcome reached when Group i_1 plays q_{i_1} and Group i_2 plays q_{i_2} in Stage 1, and Party p_1 plays r_{p_1} and Party p_2 plays r_{p_2} in Stage 2. |
| α | number of votes acquired by Party A |
| β | number of votes acquired by Party B |
| M | non-aligned moderate voters |
| λ_i | Group i 's utility from getting the most closely positioned party elected, $0 \leq \lambda_i \leq 1$ |
| $1 - \lambda_i$ | Group i 's utility from having as many platforms as possible positioned as closely as possible to its ideal point |
| m_i | amount of out-group voters Group i has the potential to mobilize behind Party p |
| l_i | amount of in-group voters Group i promises to deliver to Party p |
| e_{IPR} | amount of Group i in-group voters who will exit the two-party system if Party p chooses action r (e_M means these voters are non-aligned moderates) |
| d_{IPR} | amount of Group i in-group voters who will defect to the opposing party because Party p chooses action r |
| n | amount of non-aligned moderate voters one party picks up when the opposing party leaves it at the median |
| V | amount of non-aligned moderate voters one party picks up |
| X_p | the ideal point of Party p |
| X_i | the ideal point of Group i |

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Table 3 Reference Text Scores

| Year | DNC Ideological Score | DNC Platform Wordcount | RNC Ideological Score | RNC Platform Wordcount |
|------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|
| 1992 | 12.30769 | 8,293 | 30.41504 | 28,365 |
| 1996 | 8.783784 | 18,032 | 24.21696 | 27,160 |
| 2000 | -3.596991 | 23,964 | 33.31392 | 34,503 |
| 2004 | 8.552631 | 17,821 | 25.56306 | 42,076 |

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Table 4: Party Concessions to Interest Group Testifiers

| | Coeff. | Z | Pr(Z) |
|---------------------------|-------------------|----------|--------------|
| Ideological Congruence | 0.171 (0.078) | 2.18 | 0.030 |
| Loyalty | 2.939 (1.469) | 2.00 | 0.045 |
| Resources | 0.135 (2.45) | 0.06 | 0.956 |
| Resources X Loyalty | -0.7388 (2.17) | -0.34 | 0.734 |
| Constant | -27.37 (3.91) | -7.00 | 0.000 |
| <hr/> | | | |
| N | 54 | | |
| Wald Chi-sq. (6) | 104.9 | | |
| Prob > Chi2 | 0.000 | | |
| Adj. R-squared | 0.67 | | |

The dependent variable is the negative absolute value of the difference between groups' Wordscores values for their testimony and the Wordscore value of the DNC platform that year. The numbers in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors clustered on group. Fixed effects for time (using dummies) were included in estimation but not reported.

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Figure 1 Strategy Matrix

| | | Group G Loyal to Party A | | | Group G Splits Loyalty | | | Group G Loyal to Party B | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | Party B → F | Party B → N | Party B → G | Party B → F | Party B → N | Party B → G | Party B → F | Party B → N | Party B → G |
| Group F Loyal to Party A | Party A → F | A AFF | A A FN | A A FG | A S FF | A S FN | A S FG | A B FF | A B FN | A B FG |
| | Party A → Neither | A A NF | A A NN | A A NG | A S NF | A S NN | A S NG | A B NF | A B NN | A B NG |
| | Party A → G | A A GF | A A GN | A A GG | A S GF | A S GN | A S GG | A B GF | A B GN | A B GG |
| Group F Splits Loyalty | Party A → F | S A FF | S A FN | S A FG | S S FF | S S FN | S S FG | S B FF | S B FN | S B FG |
| | Party A → Neither | S A NF | S A NN | S A NG | S S NF | S S NN | S S NG | S B NF | S B NN | S B NG |
| | Party A → G | S A GF | S A GN | S A GG | S S GF | S S GN | S S GG | S B GF | S B GN | S B GG |
| Group F Loyal to Party B | Party A → F | B A FF | B A FN | B A FG | B S FF | B S FN | B S FG | B B FF | B B FN | B B FG |
| | Party A → Neither | B A NF | B A NN | B A NG | B S NF | B S NN | B S NG | B B NF | B B NN | B B NG |
| | Party A → G | B A GF | B A GN | B A GG | B S GF | B S GN | B S GG | B B GF | B B GN | B B GG |

Figure 2A Wordscores Distribution of DNC Platform and Group Testifiers, 1996




Figure 2B Wordscores Distribution of DNC Platform and Group Testifiers, 2000




Figure 2C Wordscores Distribution of DNC Platform and Group Testifiers, 2004




Figure 3 Conditional Effect of Loyalty on Resources for Platform Inclusior

