The American Political Science Association Meeting in Toronto, Ontario, and the Visions in Methodology Conference, Columbus, Ohio.
While parties view interest groups as a means to mobilize voters, interest groups view parties and their platforms as a means to articulate interests. We demonstrate the conditions under which parties will articulate an organized interest group’s preferred positions in its quadrennial platform. Utility functions illustrate that parties will reward groups that can mobilize voters, as evidenced by a group’s resources, loyalty to the party, and ideological similarity to the party status quo. We test these implications using content analysis on three years of DNC platforms and group testimony. Results show that parties reward loyal groups that are ideologically near the party, but that resources have no effect.
University of Birmingham Distinguished Lecture Series, Birmingham, England, and at the Institute of Social Sciences, the Hague, Netherlands.
Of what relative importance are strategic motivators for bilateral aid donors, and how important is a recipient’s geographic proximity to conflict relative to previously examined economic and political motivators? We find that donors have historically responded to balanced incentives to reduce recipient poverty and further donor political and economic goals. Every bilateral donor conditions aid on conflict. The United States allocates large amounts of development aid to countries bordering a conflict, both pre- and post-Cold War. However, controlling for development levels and donor economic and political interest, most donors reduce aid to a recipient with an in-house or nearby intense conflict.
The American Political Science Association Conference in Philadelphia, PA, and at the National Science Foundation Principal Investigator’s Meeting in Washington, DC.
We use a survey to study how the revision of risk perceptions due to catastrophic events influences an individual’s probability of returning to or maintaining his/her place of residence. Some respondents are people who were directly affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; others are people that live in areas that might be threatened by hurricanes in the future. Participants will be asked either about their real experiences or about hypothetical situations. The catastrophe, be it real or hypothetical, includes not only the hurricane itself, but also the shortsightedness of delaying or under-funding levee reconstruction, as well as the public administration failures in attempting to mitigate the hurricane’s damage. An efficient incentive system is one in which people who have the appetite for the risk select to stay in hurricane-threatened areas. In part this appetite may be influenced by perceptions of place. What is an efficient policy? Does an “economically efficient” policy have sociological implications? How will such a policy impact the socio-economic, cultural and racial make-up of a community?
The Western Political Science Association Conference in Oakland, CA, and the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C.
While the European Union’s role in Member States’ economic policy is fairly clear, its role in social policy is still questionable. On the record, Member States have created the requisite policies, ministries, and agencies pertaining to violence against women. Yet the implementation of these policies is not consistently regulated by the EU, nor does membership depend on it, and it has thus evolved in different manners in each state. In particular, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece, despite conforming to EU standards, have experienced vast differences in the implementation and effects of policies regarding violence against women. What it is that causes the evolution of rights in one state to be so different from another, despite the top-down regulations imposed by the EU? It is our contention that policy implementation, while constrained by international norms and guidelines, is also the product of an intricate combination of national and organizational factors specific to each nation-state, as well as a web of transnational networks of advocacy coalitions. By synthesizing the literature on social movements, public policy, and bureaucratic organization, we suggest that while local cultures constrain policy implementation, variations in a movement’s focus, resources, and organizational constraints within their given societal context, along with their participation in advocacy networks, determine how and if policies are implemented, despite top-down regulation. This paper represents a preliminary research design of an extensive project begun in May 2004 on the implementation of policies regarding violence against women in Southern Europe. We present theoretical and historical context for the issue we intend to study, as well as a few descriptive statistics that serve as motivation.